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ECONOMIC 
NOTES
THE PROCESSING OF
AUSTRALIAN 
ALU RAIN A
AND OTHER MINERALS
A writer for The Financial Times of 
L on d on  re c e n tly  sum m ed up the 
international aluminium industry’s plans 
for investment in Australia as follows: “The 
aluminium investment plans for Australia 
amount altogether to some £1.5 billion, The 
sheer size of the total investment, together 
with the fact that nearly all the major 
companies are involved in Australian 
projects, marks a turning point in the 
development of the international industry.” 
(1)
The local processing of bauxite (into 
alumina and aluminium) is not the only local 
processing activity to be created or 
expanded: there are to be substantial 
investments in petro-chemical plants using 
Australian natural gas as a feedstock; a 
large steel plant may yet be established in 
Western Australia (especially if a direct rail 
link is built between Western Australia and 
the Queensland coal mines); Tonkin of South 
Australia is talking of a uranium enrichment 
plant; and a coal liquefaction plant is not at
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all a remote possibility.
The recent report of “ the Crawford 
Committee” endorsed the present Australian 
Government’s desire to encourage “resource- 
based development” (2). The same Crawford 
had, with the now Foreign Minister of Japan 
(Professor Okita), recommended more or less 
the same thing for Australia in reporting to 
the Australian and Japanese Governments 
in 1976 (3). Spokespersons for the large 
in te rn a tio n a l co rp o ra tio n s speak  
euphorically of the prospects for Australian 
mineral resources over the next decade; but 
there is little benefit in prospect for 
Australian workers as a whole and, 
interestingly, there may be only small 
openings for Australian capital.
Roughly three-quarters of Australia’s 
bauxite production is refined locally: at 
Gladstone, Queensland — by Queensland 
Alumina Ltd; atKwinana and Pinjarra, WA
— by Alcoa Aust; and at Gove, NT — by the 
joint ventures, Austraswiss and Gove 
Alumina Ltd. (4)
Of the alumina produced, over 90 per cent 
is exported — only somewhat less than 10 per 
cent is smelted locally to produce aluminium: 
at Bell Bay, Tasmania — by Comalco; at 
Kurri Kurri, NSW  — by Alcan Aust; and at 
Point Henry, Vic — by Alcoa Aust. Two- 
thirds of the aluminium produced is used 
within Australia, The Australian production 
of alumina is about a quarter of total world 
production and Australia’s present exports 
of alumina account for about half of the 
international trade in alumina.
New refineries are proposed for Wagerup 
and Worsley; the smelters at Point Henry 
and Kurri Kurri are to be expanded; and 
several new smelters will soon be built. The 
expanded smelting capacity is clearly the 
more important development.
Plans have been announced by Comalco to 
build a smelter at Gladstone, by Alumax 
(owned by A M A X  of the US and Mitsui) to 
build a smelter at Newcastle, and by Alcoa to 
build a smelter in Victoria. Furthermore, 
several companies have begun investigating 
proposals for other smelters in Queensland, 
Western A ustralia  and the Northern  
Territory. The first three new smelters plus 
the announced expansions of existing 
smelters will increase capacity in the 
Australian aluminium industry from 257,000 
tonnes per annum to 860,000 tonnes per 
annum. Other smelters being considered 
could increase capacity to 1,200,000 tonnes 
per annum within half a decade or so, or to 
roughly the present capacity of the Japanese 
aluminium industry.
Energy for the smelters will be provided, in 
the main, by thermal power stations burning 
coal. According to the writer for the 
F in a n c ia l T im es  (5), the aluminium  
producers anticipate that energy will be 
supplied in Australia at a much lower cost 
than in Europe, Japan and even from new 
generating plants in North America. In fact, 
aluminium exports are often represented as a 
means of exporting Australia’s abundant 
energy. All the same, it is not inconceivable, 
given the rivalry between state governments
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in Australia, that the supply of energy to the 
aluminium producers will actually be 
subsidised by other users of electric power.
There are seven disturbing characteristics 
of the nascent aluminium industry. The 
clearest is that it will be in the hands of 
highly concentrated international capital. 
Six very large corporations currently 
account for 60 per cent of alumina capacity 
and 55 per cent of primary aluminium 
capacity outside the socialist economies (6).
Five of the six corporations are already 
involved in alumina or aluminium 
production (or both) in Australia. They are 
Kaiser, Alcoa, Alusuisse, Alcan and 
Pechiney. Alcan Aust is at least 70 per cent 
foreign-owned; Alcoa Aust is at least 51 per 
cent foreign-owned; Alusuisse has a 70 per­
cent interest in the Gove Joint Venture 
(Nabalco); Kaiser owns 45 per cent of 
Comalco; and Kaiser and Pechiney directly 
own 28.3 per cent and 20.0 per cent 
respectively of Queensland Alumina Ltd 
(QAL), while Kaiser owns a further 13.5 per 
cent through its interests in Comalco, 
another shareholder in QAL (7). Of the five 
current operators of refineries or smelters in 
Australia, only in Alcoa is Australian equity 
in excess of 30 per cent. (In Alcoa it may be as 
high as 49 per cent.)
The three new smelters already planned 
will be owned by Alumax (100 per cent 
foreign-owned), Alcoa and a consortium 
consisting of Comalco, Kaiser and five 
Japanese companies (8). The further 
projects, still being discussed but likely to go 
ahead within a few years, involve Alusuisse, 
Pechiney and the sixth of the very large 
corporations, Reynolds (of the US) (9).
The most significant aspect of foreign 
ownership and control, from the point of 
view of Australian capital, is that it makes it 
less likely that surplus created within the 
alumina and aluminium industries will be 
made available even within the country, let 
alone within other parts of the economy. 
Kaiser, for example, might export most of its 
surplus to finance a new steelworks in, say, 
Ecuador. Australian capital, except that part 
o f it represented by large domestic 
corporations such as BHP and CSR, may 
also fear being squeezed out of the industry; 
the large international corporations may feel 
no need either to seek local “joint ventures” 
or to issue shares on Australian stock
exchanges. And recent statements by 
members of the Foreign Investment Review 
Board and by Doug Anthony do not indicate 
that either the board or the federal 
government would be very concerned if the 
international corporations dispensed with 
offers of local equity (10).
From the point of view of Australian 
workers, the degree of foreign ownership and 
control has a bearing on the number of jobs 
available locally. Otherwise, however, it is 
the “privateness” and concentration of 
ownership of an industry that is important, 
rather than whether or not ownership is held 
by large foreign or large domestic 
corporations.
The aluminium industry is extraordinarily 
capital-intensive. When established, a large 
plant provides few jobs directly. Together, 
the proposed expansions of smelting 
capacity at Kurri Kurri and Point Henry,the 
three proposed new smelters in Victoria, 
NSW and Queensland, plus the two 
proposed new refineries at Wagerup and 
Worsley, are expected to add merely 4,500 
new jobs (11). A total of some 6,000 
temporary jobs will also be provided in the 
construction of the new alumina and 
aluminium capacity (12).
Just who will fill the permanent jobs is 
somewhat in doubt. The highly skilled 
technicians required to operate the smelters 
may well be brought to Australia from other 
countries. It is the immigration of just such 
workers that MacKellar, the federal Minister 
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, seems 
to have been defending in a recent address to 
the infamously right-wing Institute of Public 
Affairs. (13)
The unskilled process workers will be 
recruited locally. The work done by this lower 
tier of workers in an aluminium smelter is, 
from all accounts, a very good example of 
Harry Braveman’s “degraded” work (14). 
And few, if any, of the unskilled workers 
would ever acquire skills “on the job” that 
would enable them to enter the higher tier of 
workers.
The ownership and control of an industry 
by large corporations with substantial 
facilities abroad raises the possibility that 
very little profit may be reported locally. The 
large international corporations are clearly 
not subject to the threat that low reported
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Appendix
EQUITY INTERESTS IN COMPANIES WHICH OWN AUSTRALIA’S BAUXITE MINES, 
ALUMINA REFINERIES AND ALUMINIUM SMELTERS
Alcan Australia Ltd.
70 per cent Alcan Aluminium Limited 
30 per cent Public 
Alcoa of Australia Limited
51 per cent Aluminium Company of America 
20 per cent Westminer Investments Pty, Ltd.
16 per cent BH South Limited
12 per cent North Broken Hill Ltd.
1 per cent other
Comalco Limited
45 per cent Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation
45 per cent Conzinc Riotinto of Australia Ltd.
10 per cent Public
Gove Joint Venture (Austraswiss/GAL)
70 per cent Swiss Aluminium Australia Pty. Ltd.
(100 per cent Swiss Aluminium Ltd.)
30 per cent Gove Alumina Limited
51 per cent CSR Ltd.
13 per cent Peko-WallBend Ltd.
36 per cent Australian insurance companies and banks 
Queensland Alumina Limited
30.3 per cent Comalco Limited
28.3 per cent Kaiser Alumina Australia Corporation
(100 per cent Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation)
21.4 per cent Alcan Queensland Pty. Ltd.
(100 per cent Alcan Aluminium Limited)
20 per cent Aluminium Pechiriey Australia Pty. Ltd.
(100 per cent Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann) —
Source: Dept, of Trade and Resources, as cited by Dept, of Industry and Commerce, op.cit.
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profits may provoke take-over bids. 
Australian operations may be made to 
appear only minimally profitable by 
manipulation of the prices of transactions 
between the Australian subsidiary and other 
parts of the same corporation abroad. 
Exports by the Australian subsidiary may be 
“under-invoiced” ; and imports may be “over­
invoiced” . Prices are administered in order to 
disguise the transfer of profit within the 
corporation,
Queensland Alumina Ltd provided, during 
the years of the mining boom, a good 
example of just what can be done (15). QAL 
(operating the Gladstone refinery) is and was 
owned by the refinery’s principal customers
— Comalco, Kaiser separately, Alcan and 
Pechiney. During the first eight years of the 
refinery’s operation to 1972, QAL paid no 
income tax, although profits on its balance 
sheet had accumulated to $30.8 million. QAL 
was able to deduct from profits: (i) 
depreciation and investment allowances, (ii) 
interest payments on its extraordinarily 
high proportion of borrowed funds (evidently 
provided by the corporate shareholders), and 
(iii) past notional losses in its trade witji its 
shareholder-purchasers.
Those purchasers of alumina registered in 
Australia were liable to pay tax on the 
difference between the price they paid QAL 
for alumina and what was deemed by the 
Australian Taxation Office to be the ruling 
world price of alumina. There is no 
information as to whether they did pay any 
such tax; but it would be surprising had the 
Taxation Office been able to put a successful 
case.
It is surprising that relatively small-scale 
Australian capital is not actively lobbying 
the Australian government for a tightening 
up of the taxation o f international 
corporations operating within Australia. 
The less tax is paid by the international 
corporations, the more must be paid by 
Australian capital, except to the extent that 
more revenue can be extorted from workers.
It is claimed for Comalco that the new 
smelter at Gladstone will indirectly provide 
employment in Australia for some two and a 
half times as many persons as are provided 
with employment directly (either in 
operating or in constructing the plant). (16) 
/ITiat sort Of claim can only be made on the 
basis of extremely doubtful assumptions. A
very high proportion of contracts for the
supply of equipment would have to be let to
corporations producing within Australia.
The Australian Mining Industry Council
(AMIC) claims that this has indeed been the
case with mining developments in general
within Australia. (17) But even Susan
Bam brick, well-known to be a defender of the
mining companies, has avoided endorsing
AMIC’s claim. If much of the equipment
needed for mining has had to be imported, it
is much more likely that the highly
sophisticated equipment required for
processing will be imported. It seems
unlikely that many manufacturing
corporations within Australia will be able to
supply the expanding processing industries.
The aluminium industry is highly
polluting. In particular, smelting yields
hydrogen fluoride, as well as carbon dioxide,
carbon monoxide and sulphur dioxide. (18)
Furthermore, the operation needs a large
quantity of water for cooling. The aluminium 
industry is precisely one of those industries
which has contributed substantially to
Japan’s present pollution problems. It may
well be possible, not only to design less
polluting plants than exist in Japan, but to
locate smelters in regions in which they will
do little harm. But if that is the case, there
can be no guarantee that the relatively few 
jobs which the aluminium industry does 
provide will be provided near where workers 
and their families now live.
Finally, the provision of infrastructure for 
the industry, and for similar new mineral 
processing industries, will be a substantial 
charge on the revenue of the states. The 
governments of Western Australia and 
Queensland seem sure to be the most
generous and will make it difficult for other
state governments to be significantly less 
generous. As Terry O’Shaughnessy (19) and 
Garth Stevenson (20) have both argued, the 
Western Australian and Queensland 
governments have identified themselves 
intimately with international capital.
Their provision of electric power has 
already been mentioned but, in addition, 
they supply much of the housing and 
associated services, water installation, port 
facilities, roads, and so oh- The states are 
thus advancing mych of the constant capital'
for'processing (as well as mining) while, as 
was earlier suggested, taxation of corporate
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income is unlikely to transfer anywherenear >
as much of the surplus generated as the, ' 
nominal rate of company taxation might 
indicate it would.
In all, the proposals for increased local 
processing ofAustralian minerals look very 
nluch like proposals for “ free-trade zones” in 
South-East Asia. The major difference is that 
in South-East Asia corporations are being 
guaranteed large numbers of effectively 
oppressed workers on subsistence wages 
while in Australia they are being provided 
with relatively cheap energy. But it is 
significant that the Queensland and Western 
Australian governments are attempting to 
guarantee the supply of electric power by 
means of repressive industrial relations 
legislation.
No attempt is going to be made by the 
present federal government or by state 
governments to ensure that the new 
industries become linked with existing
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